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I. INTRODUCTION 
When President Donald J. Trump proposed a “separate, but equal” sixth 
branch of the United States Armed Forces, the Space Force, his proposal was 
met with little enthusiasm.1 Even setting aside the President’s unfortunate use 
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of a phrase synonymous with racial segregation, the Space Force conjured 
images of X-Wings and lightsabers, more so than serious national security 
policy. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Space Force was derided across late night 
television and social media.2 Regardless of what science fiction images this 
proposal inspires, the need for space-based national security is an issue that 
urgently demands bipartisan attention.  
As far back as the year 2001, a Pentagon Commission recognized that “[t]he 
security and economic well being of the United States . . . depend[s] on the 
nation’s ability to operate successfully in space.”3 Yet even as satellites and 
space-dependent technology continue to play an ever more important role in 
American life, defense experts largely agree that the U.S. military is failing to 
adequately protect those crucial assets from foreign interference.4 With the 
development of anti-satellite missiles and other sophisticated space weapons by 
 
King and Jessica Van Ranken. Special thanks to Professor Guy A. Rub for his continuous 
mentorship and guidance throughout my legal education. All errors are my own.  
 1 President Donald J. Trump, Remarks at a Meeting with the National Space Council 
and Signing of Space Policy Directive-3 (June 18, 2018) (transcript available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-meeting-
national-space-council-signing-space-policy-directive-3/); see Mike Rogers, Opinion, 
In 2019 Let’s Address the ‘Real Problems’ in National Security Space, SPACENEWS (Jan. 13, 
2019), https://spacenews.com/in-2019-lets-address-the-real-problems-in-national-sec 
urity-space/ [https://perma.cc/KM62-ZYYS].  
 2 Retired NASA astronaut and commander of Space Shuttle Endeavor Mark Kelly took 
to Twitter after the Space Force announcement: “This is a dumb idea. The Air Force does 
this already. That is their job. What’s next, we move submarines to the 7th branch and call 
it the ‘under-the-sea force?’” Mark Kelly (@ShuttleCDRKelly), TWITTER (June 18, 2018, 
8:14 PM), https://twitter.com/ShuttleCDRKelly/status/1008910946742472707 
[https://perma.cc/H53U-A4UL]; see also Late Night Roasts Trump’s Space Force, CNN 
(Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/videos/cnnmoney/2018/08/10/late-night-pence-
trump-space-force-orig-gs.cnn [https://perma.cc/HN6X-YYB2] (reporting that late 
night hosts mocked the establishment of a Space Force).  
 3 DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO ASSESS UNITED STATES NATIONAL 
SECURITY SPACE MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION 9 (2001). Also known as the “Rumsfeld 
Commission” because of its leadership by then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, this 
commission warned that the United States needed to protect itself against a “Space Pearl 
Harbor.” Id. at viii.  
 4 Nick Stockton, The 19th Century Argument for a 21st Century Space Force, WIRED 
(Sept. 9, 2018) https://www.wired.com/story/space-force-mahan-argument/ [https:// 
perma.cc/NA3B-VNKX] (valuing the commercial space industry at $350 billion in 2017); 
John Venable, A U.S. Space Force: Will It Ever Be Launched?, NAT’L INT. (Jan. 13, 2019), 
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/us-space-force-will-it-ever-be-launched-41327 
[https://perma.cc/N7HF-6ARH] (“Banking, commerce, travel, entertainment, the 
functions of government and our military all depend heavily on our assets in space.”); id. (“It 
is public knowledge that Russian and Chinese militaries now have the capability to put 
American space assets at risk—and that we haven’t taken steps to protect those 
systems . . . .”).  
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global rivals like Russia and China,5 the necessity of extending the military 
operations into the final frontier has become a question of “when,” not “if.”6 
Fortunately, the wheels of power have already begun to turn in Washington that 
will bring some kind of Space Force into existence. President Trump has signed 
Space Policy Directive-4, instructing the Pentagon to present legislation that 
will create an independent Space Force under the control of the Air Force 
Secretary.7  
Yet passing such substantial legislation in a divided Congress will be an 
uphill battle, and the proposal already faces some opposition.8 Several other 
plans have also circulated about where this new branch would best fit within the 
modern military structure; if President Trump and his allies had their way, the 
Space Force would be the first military branch created since the Air Force broke 
out from underneath the U.S. Army in 1947.9  
But what exactly does that mean? Should the Space Force have its own 
civilian department under the Department of Defense, achieving parity with the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force? Or will the Space Force proceed through Congress 
under its current plan as a service component under another Air Force 
Department, akin to the Marine Corps and the U.S. Navy’s coexistence under 
the Naval Department? Alternatively, are the calls for a “separate, but equal” 
Space Force all bluster, when in fact, it will (and should) amount to something 
much less? For example, some defense experts and legislators suggest the best 
version of a Space Force amounts to a mere reorganization of existing space-
 
 5 DEP’T OF DEF., FINAL REPORT ON ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE 
FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE COMPONENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 4 
(2018). 
 6 David Deptula, Space Force: Go Slow, Learn from Army Air Corps, BREAKING DEF. 
(June 22, 2018), https://breakingdefense.com/2018/06/space-force-go-slow-learn-
from-army-air-corps/ [https://perma.cc/GAU3-3S3P]. 
 7 Space Policy Directive-4 of February 19, 2019: Establishment of the United State 
Space Force, 84 Fed. Reg. 6049 (Feb. 25, 2019) [hereinafter Directive-4]; John S. McCain 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 
1636 (2018); Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, President Donald J. 
Trump Is Building the United States Space Force for a 21st Century Military, WHITE HOUSE 
(Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-
trump-building-united-states-space-force-21st-century-military/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4WZQ-EY9F]. 
 8 See, e.g., Marina Koren, Trump’s Space Force Faces an Uncertain Fate, ATLANTIC 
(Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/11/space-force-
trump-democrats-congress/575359/ [https://perma.cc/64FV-LF9A] (“[E]ven before the 
midterm elections, the Space Force proposal had tepid support among lawmakers, including 
Republicans.”).  
 9 Jacqueline Klimas, Trump Going for Full-Blown Space Force, White House Memo 
Reveals, POLITICO (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/29/space-
force-military-branch-999528 [https://perma.cc/4H7S-CZAL]. 
4 IN DEFENSE OF THE SPACE FORCE [Vol. 80  
related resources or creation of a warfighting entity like the United States Cyber 
Command.10  
Management and organization of national defense within civilian 
government have been ongoing struggles since the beginning of the republic. 
While the proposal of the Space Force marks the first significant transformation 
of our military administration in a while, policymakers can look to the lessons 
of past military reorganization efforts for guidance. Chief among these lessons 
is the story of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 
Act of 1986.11 Drafted in response to numerous problems in military 
preparedness and operational effectiveness, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense 
Reorganization Act was heralded at the time as “[o]ne of the landmark laws of 
American history . . . probably the greatest sea change in the history of the 
American military since the Continental Congress created the Continental Army 
in 1775.”12 The Goldwater-Nichols Act fundamentally reshaped the 
administration of national security and put forth lessons of law and military 
administration that remain significant to this day.13 As such, Goldwater-Nichols 
can serve as a comprehensive model for the development of a Space Force going 
forward.  
This Note argues the values and lessons embodied in the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act illuminate the current Space Force proposals and justify the creation of the 
Space Force as an independent co-equal sixth branch of the United States Armed 
Forces.14 In Part II, this Note recounts a brief history of military law and 
administration in the United States, and examines the factors leading up to the 
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, its passage, and the modern 
military administrative structure created in its wake. Part III evaluates the 
current proposals for the Space Force, their legal authority, and policy 
justifications. Part IV looks back to the values and lessons of the Goldwater-
Nichols Act and applies them to the different Space Force proposals to argue 
 
 10 See Venable, supra note 4; see also Michael O’Hanlon, There’s No ‘Jungle Force.’ 
Who Needs a Space Force?, WALL ST. J. (June 27, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/theres-no-jungle-force-who-needs-a-space-force-1530 
139953 [https://perma.cc/CDJ9-WN9X].  
 11 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).  
 12 GORDON NATHANIEL LEDERMAN, REORGANIZING THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: THE 
GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 1986 xi (1999) (recounting the statements of Congressman 
Les Aspin, a chief co-sponsor of the bill in the House of Representatives).  
 13 See id. 
 14 There are many unanswered legal questions about the legality of weaponizing space, 
a frontier that is designated as peaceful according to international law, but such a discussion 
is beyond the scope of this Note. For more in-depth analysis of this topic, see generally 
Steven Freeland, Peaceful Purposes? Governing the Military Uses of Outer Space, 18 EUR. 
J.L. REFORM 35 (2016); P.J. Blount, Targeting in Outer Space: Legal Aspects of Operational 
Military Actions in Space, HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. (Nov. 25, 2012), http://harvard 
nsj.org/2012/11/targeting-in-outer-space-legal-aspects-of-operational-military-action 
s-in-space/ [https://perma.cc/URZ2-HMMY]. 
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that a “separate, but equal” Space Force with its own civilian department offers 
the best path forward. Part V briefly concludes.  
II. THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN MILITARY ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE 
To understand where the current Space Force proposals fit within the 
modern military apparatus, it is important to understand the American military 
structure in existence today and how it was formed under Goldwater-Nichols. 
This Part begins with a brief overview of the modern military structure and 
terminology, because colloquial usage of military terms like “branch,” 
“service,” and “command” often differ widely from their meaning in Title 10 of 
the United States Code.15 This Part will first explore the historical precursors to 
Goldwater-Nichols, including the military operational failures that inspired its 
passage. Finally, Goldwater-Nichols’s effects on the structure of the Armed 
Forces will be explored.  
A. The Modern Structure of the United States Armed Forces 
The current modern military structure of the United States Armed Forces 
comprises five “services”: the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast 
Guard.16 A single officer known as a service chief heads each branch: the Army 
and Air Force have chiefs of staff, the Marine Corps has a commandant, and the 
Navy has a chief of naval operations.17 As the highest military officers in their 
respective services, only other more senior service chiefs and the Chairman and 
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outrank these officers in the overall 
military command structure.18 
Each service is organized within three civilian military departments: the 
Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, and the Department of the 
 
 15 See LEDERMAN, supra note 12, at xiii (defining military structure and key 
terminology). 
 16 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(4) (2012). The Coast Guard occupies a unique role in the U.S. 
Armed Forces. While it is considered a “branch” of the United States Armed Forces, it 
operates underneath part of the Department of Homeland Security (as opposed to the 
Department of Defense), has its own separate statutory code—Title 14 (whereas all other 
branches are under Title 10), and does not have a formal seat at the table in the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. However, in times of war, or at the direction of the President, the Coast Guard can 
transfer to be beneath the Department of Navy. The Coast Guard: America’s Oldest 
Maritime Defenders, GOCOASTGUARD.COM, https://www.gocoastguard.com/about-the-
coast-guard/learn-the-history [https://perma.cc/D7NN-68MZ]. The United States Merchant 
Marine resembles a military service, but actually has a statutory support role to the U.S. 
Armed Forces and is excluded from recognition as part of the Armed Forces, despite multiple 
suits by Merchant Marine veterans seeking veteran benefits. See Fogel v. Dep’t of Def., 169 
F. Supp. 2d 140 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Schumacher v. Aldridge, 665 F. Supp. 41 (D.D.C. 1987). 
 17 10 U.S.C. § 743 (2012).  
 18 Id. 
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Air Force.19 A civilian service secretary heads each department and directs the 
administration, support, and attendant bureaucracy of their respective branches 
from the Pentagon.20 Each civilian service secretary, in conjunction with the 
Department of Defense (DOD), organizes the administrative and mission-
essential support functions of each branch, like training and arms 
procurement.21 For example, the Secretary of the Navy has statutory 
responsibility “to conduct all the affairs of the Department of the Navy, 
including: recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, mobilizing, 
and demobilizing. The Secretary also oversees the construction, outfitting, and 
repair of naval ships, equipment and facilities.”22 In addition, the civilian 
secretaries are responsible for formulation and implementation of all national 
security policies and programs set forth by the President and Secretary of 
Defense.23 
The three civilian military departments operate within the DOD, which is 
headed by the Secretary of Defense, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) providing staff support to the Defense Secretary.24 The Secretary of 
Defense answers directly to the President,25 who enjoys constitutionally-vested 
authority as Commander-in-Chief to direct the military through this military 
apparatus.26  
Within the DOD exists the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the nation’s top 
military advisors. The JCS is a seven-member body composed of a Chairman, 
Vice Chairman, the service chiefs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, 
and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.27 The JCS is supported by the Joint 
Staff, a body of civilian DOD employees and military officers selected in equal 
numbers from each service (other than the Coast Guard) by the JCS Chairman.28 
 
 19 The Marine Corps is commonly thought of as an entirely independent branch, but it 
actually cohabitates with the Navy under the Department of the Navy. See id. § 101(a)(8).  
 20 LEDERMAN, supra note 12, at xiii.  
 21 10 U.S.C. § 191 (2012); see also id. §§ 8451–81 (establishing the U.S. Naval 
Academy in Annapolis, Maryland that trains both Marine and Naval officers); id. § 7431 
(establishing the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, New York); id. § 9431 (establishing 
the U.S. Air Force Academy). The Secretary of Homeland Security oversees the 
administration of the Coast Guard Academy. 14 U.S.C. § 1901 (2012).  
 22 Secretary of the Navy: Responsibilities, U.S. NAVY, 
https://www.navy.mil/navydata/leadership/secnav_respons.asp [https://perma.cc/9F 
W5-EQ56]. 
 23 See id.  
 24 10 U.S.C. § 131(d) (2012).  
 25 See id. § 111. As a nod to the tenet of civilian control of the military, a person cannot 
be appointed to Secretary of Defense within seven years of relief from active duty from the 
armed forces. See id. § 113.  
 26 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.  
 27 10 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). 
 28 Id. § 155 (grouping together the Navy and the Marine Corps for purposes of selecting 
officers for the Joint Staff). 
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The President appoints the JCS Chairman with the advice and consent of 
the Senate to serve as the “principal military advisor” to the President, Secretary 
of Defense, and the National Security Council.29 Other Joint Chiefs must submit 
any dissenting advice or opinions on a course of action to the President by 
submitting them in writing to the Chairman who passes them on to the 
President.30 In addition to serving as the principal military advisor to the 
President, the Chairman functions as an overarching strategic decision maker 
who coordinates high-level joint military readiness and capabilities, develops 
the country’s overall “National Military Strategy,” and promulgates national 
military Risk Assessments, among other duties.31  
While the Chairman is the highest-ranking military officer in the Armed 
Forces, he or she does not actually exercise any military operational authority 
as many traditionally think of military power.32 Coordination of boots-on-the-
ground combat operations falls to the Combatant Commanders (CCDRs).33 
Combatant Commanders are four-star generals or admirals who lead Combat 
Commands (COCOMs) comprised of troops assigned to them from across the 
different branches by the Secretary of Defense.34 The JCS Chairman has 
oversight over the CCDRs and communicates on their behalf to the President 
but possesses no actual direct military operational control.35 Instead, authority 
flows directly from the President to the CCDRs through the Secretary of 
Defense.36  
Combatant commands exist as “unified commands” for completion of 
broader missions or “specified commands” for more specific functional 
missions.37 Until the recent elevation of U.S. Space Command,38 there were ten 
Unified Combatant Commands: four that are divided into specific commands 
based on “functional” responsibilities and six unified commands based on 
“geographic” responsibilities.39 The most recent Unified Combatant Command 
 
 29 Id. §§ 151–52. 
 30 Id. § 151(d). 
 31 Id. § 153. 
 32 See id. § 152(c). 
 33 10 U.S.C. § 164 (2012).  
 34 Id. § 161; ANDREW FEICKERT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42077, THE UNIFIED 
COMMAND PLAN AND COMBATANT COMMANDS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 
13 (2013). For more information on military rank structure, see generally U.S. Military Rank 
Insignia, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://defense.gov/Our-Story/Insignias/#enlisted-
insignias [https://perma.cc/H5X4-YZHX].  
 35 10 U.S.C. § 163 (2012). 
 36 Id. §§ 162(b), 163.  
 37 CHARLES NEMFAKOS ET AL., RAND NAT’L DEF. RESEARCH INST., THE PERFECT 
STORM: THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT AND ITS EFFECT ON NAVY ACQUISITION 14 n.6 
(2010).  
 38 See infra Part III.B.2.  
 39 Dan Maurer, Fiduciary Duty, Honor, Country: Legislating a Theory of Agency into 
Strategic Civil-Military Relations, 10 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 259, 300 n.193 (2019). Specified 
commands organized around their functional responsibilities include: U.S. Strategic 
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created was U.S. Cyber Command.40 These combatant commands are composed 
of and led by officers of multiple different branches with the authority to execute 
warfighting missions and wield actual military force.41  
B. Military Organizational Failures Leading up to Goldwater-Nichols 
Despite historical military success, American military organization has not 
always served as a model of coherence and careful planning. In fact, prior to the 
enactment of Goldwater-Nichols, the military command structures were rigid, 
parallel chains of command that were often cumbersome, especially when 
attempting to undertake joint operations.42 Goldwater-Nichols was foundational 
in alleviating these organizational problems.43  
The problems resulting from coordination failures and inter-branch rivalry 
were obvious from the beginning of the modern military. At the start of World 
War II, significant organizational problems abounded despite the existence of 
just two military services: the Army and Navy.44 While President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt had organized an informal committee of U.S. service chiefs and high-
ranking officers to advise on the war effort, disputes between the military 
branches and resulting strategic failures revealed this informal structure to be 
woefully inadequate.45 Distrust between the two service branches led to internal 
power struggles, strategic disagreements, and general disorganization that 
directly harmed the U.S. war effort in the Pacific theatre.46  
 
Command (USSTRATCOM), U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), U.S. 
Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), and U.S. Cyber Command 
(USCYBERCOM), while unified geographic commands include U.S. Pacific Command 
(USPACOM), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Central Command 
(USCENTCOM), U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), U.S. Northern Command 
(USNORTHCOM), and U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM). Id.; see also Combatant 
Commands, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://www.defense.gov/Our-Story/Combatant-
Commands [https://perma.cc/HF4L-EFX8]. 
 40 10 U.S.C. § 167b (2012); Memorandum on Elevation of U.S. Cyber Command to a 
Unified Combatant Command, 82 Fed. Reg. 39,953 (Aug. 23, 2017).  
 41 See id. § 164(c).  
 42 JAMES R. LOCHER III, VICTORY ON THE POTOMAC: THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT 
UNIFIES THE PENTAGON 198 (Joseph G. Dawson et al. eds., 2002).  
 43 See KATHLEEN J. MCINNIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44474, GOLDWATER-NICHOLS 
AT 30: DEFENSE REFORM AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2016) [hereinafter GOLDWATER-
NICHOLS CRS REPORT].  
 44 LEDERMAN, supra note 12, at 8; LOCHER, supra note 42, at 198. 
 45 See LEDERMAN, supra note 12, at 10–13.  
 46 Id. at 11, 13 (“The disaster at Pearl Harbor resulted in part from a failure of 
coordination among the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii . . . .”); LOCHER, supra note 
42, at 20–21 (quoting British Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, who explained that “[t]he 
violence of interservice rivalry in the United States had to be seen to be believed and was an 
appreciable handicap to their war effort”). 
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Recognizing the fault lines in military administration that World War II 
exposed, Congress passed the groundbreaking National Security Act of 1947.47 
This created the National Military Establishment (a precursor to the DOD) 
helmed by the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force (which had previously served 
under the Army as the U.S. Army Air Corps), the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), and the National Security Council (NSC).48 The Act formally authorized 
a three-member Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on equal footing, as the “principal 
military advisors” to the President, composed of the Army, Navy, and Air Force 
service chiefs.49  
Yet even this reorganization and subsequent efforts to expand the role of the 
JCS failed to yield the organizational benefits for which Congress had hoped.50 
Each service still failed to work efficiently together, reporting directly up the 
ladder to their respective service chief without any overlap or significant 
coordination efforts.51 Moreover, “dual-hatting” of JCS service chiefs led to a 
type of “service parochialism” and created inherent conflicts of interest. As 
service chiefs, duty required jockeying for resources and acclaim for their 
respective branch, but as JCS members, a duty existed to provide even-handed 
military advice to the President from the perspective of the entire Armed 
Forces.52 Oftentimes, these goals conflicted to the detriment of sound military 
advice to the President.53  
Inter-service squabbling deepened the rift between the branches and 
wreaked havoc on the American military beyond just wartime. During 
peacetime, the procurement of military resources and development of 
warfighting strategy were tailored in isolation.54 These issues ballooned defense 
spending through duplicative purchases and hindered operational readiness.55 
 
 47 William George Eckhardt, Lawyering for Uncle Sam When He Draws His Sword, 4 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 431, 438 (2003). 
 48 OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, ORGANIZATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: 1942–2013 16–19 (2013); LEDERMAN, supra 
note 12, at 16.  
 49 LEDERMAN, supra note 12, at 16–17. 
 50 OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 48, at 18–35 
(describing notable interim military reorganization efforts like the Key West Agreement of 
1948, the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, 
and the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958).  
 51 See GOLDWATER-NICHOLS CRS REPORT, supra note 43, at 2; OFFICE OF THE 
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 48, at 37–38.  
 52 GOLDWATER-NICHOLS CRS REPORT, supra note 43, at 7. However, defense reform 
opponents at the time disputed this characterization in their campaign to oppose JCS 
reorganization. See LOCHER, supra note 42, at 100–01 (quoting then-Secretary of Defense 
Caspar Weinberger, who said: “Assignment of dual responsibilities to the chiefs is not a 
problem if the individuals are carefully chosen. There is no evidence, with the current group 
of chiefs, that a conflict exists between their service and joint roles.”).  
 53 GOLDWATER-NICHOLS CRS REPORT, supra note 43, at 7. 
 54 See NEMFAKOS ET AL., supra note 37, at 11–12.  
 55 See id.  
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Rampant fraud, waste, and abuse in the military procurement system angered 
government officials and the public alike.56 
The experience of defeat in the Vietnam War was yet another powerful 
impetus to reconsider the existing military administrative structure.57 In 
Vietnam, failures at joint operations were acute; President Kennedy became so 
frustrated by the conflicting advice on operations in Laos that he soon began to 
only invite the JCS Chairman to strategy meetings.58 Air Force General David 
Jones, who served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs from 1978 to 1982, described 
the Vietnam War as “our worst example of confused objectives and unclear 
responsibilities in Washington and in the field. Each service, instead of 
integrating efforts with the others, considered Vietnam its own war and sought 
to carve out a large mission for itself.”59  
However, it was a series of operational failures in the early 1980s that truly 
showed the organizational and structural cracks in the military administrative 
state that would lead to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.60 Desert One, 
the operations in Grenada, and the Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, 
all underscored how the ineffective, rigid command structure in existence was 
failing the military on the battlefield.61 For example, troops in Desert One 
(otherwise known as the Iranian Hostage Rescue) failed in their attempt to carry 
out the sophisticated hostage rescue in part because they quite literally met for 
the first time on the day of the operation.62 American troops conducting joint 
operations in Grenada were using tourist maps to fight given the lack of 
intelligence and strategic sharing between services.63 U.S. Army helicopters in 
Grenada were prevented from airlifting wounded soldiers to the aircraft carrier 
USS Independence because the Navy had never cleared Army helicopters to 
land on its ships.64 
Inspired by egregious examples of military dysfunction, Ronald Reagan 
campaigned on cleaning up the perceived disarray in the Pentagon and 
 
 56 Id. at 9–10; LOCHER, supra note 42, at 284–85 (describing reactions to media reports 
of Air Force overspending, including $7,622 on a coffee pot, $74,000 on an aluminum 
folding ladder, $13,000 for a crew chief seat for the C-5A cargo plane, and $640 per toilet 
seat for the P-3C aircraft). The $640 toilet seat became emblematic of Pentagon waste and 
excess. See id. at 291 (reproducing 1985 Washington Post cartoon depicting the Secretary of 
Defense wearing a toilet seat around his neck with a $640 price tag).  
 57 Ike Skelton, Joint and Combined Operations in the Post-Cold War Era, 73 MIL. 
REV. 2, 11 (1993) (“The bitter experience of Vietnam . . . sent American military men back 
to the study of war and military history.”); see also LOCHER, supra note 42, at 29–30. 
 58 LEDERMAN, supra note 12, at 58.  
 59 Ronald H. Cole, Grenada, Panama, and Haiti: Joint Operational Reform, 20 JOINT 
FORCE Q., 57, 57 (1998).  
 60 GOLDWATER-NICHOLS CRS REPORT, supra note 43, at 2–3. 
 61 Id. at 3. 
 62 Id.  
 63 Id. at 4. 
 64 LEDERMAN, supra note 12, at 67. 
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revitalizing the military.65 In 1985, Reagan set up the President’s Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Defense Management helmed by former Secretary of Defense 
(and Hewlett-Packard CEO) David Packard.66 The Packard Commission had a 
broad mandate to examine the DOD; however, its primary focus was to study 
defense procurement in order to streamline the process and root out 
inefficiency.67  
Many observers saw the efficiency-oriented reforms proposed by the 
Packard Commission and President Reagan as insufficient to address the 
deeply-rooted structural problems hampering military readiness.68 The House 
and Senate Armed Services Committees took up the call to action, conducting 
independent reviews and making a series of proposals that culminated in an act 
co-sponsored by Republican Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona and 
Democratic Representative William Flynt “Bill” Nichols of Alabama.69 Despite 
heavy resistance from the Pentagon and service chiefs,70 the initiative passed 
overwhelmingly: 383–27 in the House and 95–0 in the Senate.71 President 
Reagan signed the Act on October 1, 1986.72 
C. Effect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act 
In setting up the modern military administrative structure,73 the Goldwater-
Nichols Act sought to remedy the failures of the old military regime and embody 
certain value judgments about military administrative efficiency. By its own 
stated purposes, Goldwater-Nichols sought to improve clear lines of 
communication and advice to the President, the formulation of strategy, and 
effective use of military resources.74  
Goldwater-Nichols drastically improved inter-service relationships and the 
overall management of joint operations by putting an end to the service chiefs’ 
“dual-hatting” role.75 Previously a source of conflict, Goldwater-Nichols 
clarified that service secretaries were firmly subject to the authority of the 
Secretary of Defense, a fact left ambiguous by the National Security Act of 
1947.76 After Goldwater-Nichols, the service chiefs’ and the service secretaries’ 
 
 65 LOCHER, supra note 42, at 31, 293, 298 (discussing Reagan administration responses 
to Pentagon failures).  
 66 GOLDWATER-NICHOLS CRS REPORT, supra note 43, at 2. 
 67 Id. at 2–3.  
 68 Id. at 6.  
 69 LEDERMAN, supra note 12, at 68–76 (describing the legislative process of the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act).  
 70 See infra Part IV.C.  
 71 NEMFAKOS ET AL., supra note 37, at 14.  
 72 OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 48, at 62.  
 73 See supra Part II.A.  
 74 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, supra note 
11, at pmbl.  
 75 GOLDWATER-NICHOLS CRS REPORT, supra note 43, at 7. 
 76 LOCHER, supra note 42, at 438–39.  
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primary responsibility was “hoteling” functions instead of providing combat 
advice on behalf of their respective branches.77 In other words, the service chiefs 
were tasked with “training and equipping” the branches, while the Combatant 
Commanders directed the actual warfighting functions.78 Without direct 
involvement in operational planning, the service chiefs and service secretaries 
could focus exclusively on improving “force providers” by overseeing critical 
military training and acquisition processes.79  
In addition, Goldwater-Nichols mandated enhanced training requirements 
suitable for the new reality of warfighting via joint Combatant Commands. 
Combat Commanders suddenly led diverse forces made up of troops from across 
the different service branches.80 Goldwater-Nichols sought to foster a culture of 
mutual respect and cooperation between the branches within the officer corps.81 
For example, Goldwater-Nichols required all officers to possess joint operations 
experience and complete a joint operations “capstone course” before serving in 
any top military position.82  
In the past, the JCS had been a battleground for inter-branch disputes and 
conflicting advice rooted in self-interested “service parochialism.”83 To end 
these squabbles, Goldwater-Nichols simplified the chain of command by 
eliminating the JCS members’ status as co-equal “principal military advisors.”84 
Instead, Goldwater-Nichols elevated the JCS Chairman above the rest of the 
JCS to speak with a sole unified voice as the “principal military advisor” to the 
President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council.85 The Chairman 
could speak directly on behalf of the Combatant Commanders without 
struggling with the other service chiefs to produce a consensus opinion tailored 
to the lowest common denominator.86 Similarly, Goldwater-Nichols placed the 
Combatant Commanders directly beneath the authority of the Secretary of 
Defense and the President, increasing their importance and mitigating conflicts 
of interest with the JCS’s role as overall military strategists.87  
The reorganization of the military under Goldwater-Nichols was considered 
instrumental in the success of immediately subsequent U.S. military operations 
 
 77 Eckhardt, supra note 47, at 438. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Maurer, supra note 39, at 300; NEMFAKOS ET AL., supra note 37, at 15.  
 80 10 U.S.C. § 164(c) (2012). 
 81 See NEMFAKOS ET AL., supra note 37, at 15. 
 82 Maurer, supra note 39, at 301. 
 83 See supra Part II.B.  
 84 NEMFAKOS ET AL., supra note 37, at 14.  
 85 10 U.S.C. § 151(b) (2012).  
 86 Maurer, supra note 39, at 300. See also LOCHER, supra note 42, at 20, 440 
(“Consisting of four equals—two generals and two admirals—the JCS was unable to reach 
a decision except by unanimous agreement. On many occasions, ‘decision by the Joint Chiefs 
proved to be impossible.’”). 
 87 LOCHER, supra note 42, at 440; Maurer, supra note 39, at 300; NEMFAKOS ET AL., 
supra note 37, at 14.  
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like Desert Storm.88 The Act “rescue[d] the JCS from its own limitations and 
failures”; it reduced inefficiencies, allowed the military establishment to operate 
effectively as a cohesive unit, and supplied civilian authorities with overall 
superior military advice.89 Goldwater-Nichols marked a resounding success in 
the civil administration of military power as well: then-Defense Secretary 
Richard B. Cheney remarked that, “Goldwater-Nichols helped pull [the 
Department of Defense] together in a coherent fashion so that it functions much 
better . . . than it ever did before.”90 With minor exceptions, the military 
structure created by Goldwater-Nichols remains unchanged since 1986.91  
Despite wide acclaim, the thirtieth anniversary of the historic legislation in 
2016 was an occasion marked by some calls to consider updating it.92 While 
praising its “many positive benefits,” then-Defense Secretary Ash Carter went 
on record to say that the “pendulum between service equities and jointness may 
have swung too far” and called for the consideration of “practical updates to this 
critical organizational framework, while still preserving [Goldwater-Nichols’s] 
spirit and intent.”93 However, there has been “little consensus regarding what 
changes are needed within DOD and what specific direction reform ought to 
take.”94 While calls for reform should not be entirely dismissed, the noted lack 
 
 88 GOLDWATER-NICHOLS CRS REPORT, supra note 43, at 9 (citing then-Chairman of the 
JCS Colin Powell, who said, “You will notice in Desert Storm nobody is accusing us of 
logrolling and service parochialism and the Army fighting the Air Force and the Navy 
fighting the Marine Corps. We are now a team. The Goldwater-Nichols legislation helped 
that.”).  
 89 See Maurer, supra note 39, at 299.  
 90 LOCHER, supra note 42, at 439.  
 91 OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 48, at 79–85 
(discussing the 2008 statutory elevation of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to JCS 
membership and the 2010 disestablishment of Joint Forces Command).  
 92 Goldwater-Nichols Reform: The Way Ahead: Hearing Before the H. Armed Servs. 
Comm., 114th Cong. 1–2, 6−7 (2016) (statements of Rep. William M. “Mac” Thornberry, 
Chairman, H. Comm. on Armed Servs., and Dr. Dov Zakheim, Senior Fellow, Center for 
Naval Analyses) (calling Goldwater-Nichols “tremendously successful,” but arguing the 
Pentagon was “too top heavy” with too many Combatant Commands and “bloated” with 
attendant bureaucracy; and calling for reform to reduce bureaucracy, add greater flexibility 
in moving around DOD assets, and increase clarity in the chain of command, since the then-
current regime was built for the Cold War and not suited for modern threats); see also 
Maurer, supra note 39, at 303 (advocating for an amendment to Goldwater-Nichols to create 
a “jurisprudential agency” relationship between Congress and senior military leaders). 
 93 Lisa Ferdinando, Carter Proposes Updates to Goldwater-Nichols Act, PACOM 
NEWS (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/Article/715090/carter-
proposes-updates-to-goldwater-nichols-act/ [https://perma.cc/ZVT4-8EZZ].  
 94 GOLDWATER-NICHOLS CRS REPORT, supra note 43, at 1. Given the vast disparity in 
complaints, one former senior official compared calls for Goldwater-Nichols reform to a 
“Rorschach test” for projecting whatever grievances one has about the Pentagon into their 
calls for Goldwater-Nichols reform. Id. at 2.  
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of consensus around a unified direction for Goldwater-Nichols reform gives 
further credence to the Act’s enduring ideals.95  
III. THE SPACE FORCE PROPOSALS AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL 
AUTHORITY 
Defense industry experts, policy makers, and interested members of the 
public have been abuzz about the possibility of a Space Force since President 
Trump first announced his intention to create a “separate, but equal” sixth 
branch of the Armed Forces in June 2018.96 In February 2019, President Trump 
signed Space Policy Directive-4, instructing the Pentagon to draft legislation 
creating the Space Force, although the presumptive Space Force proposal looks 
more like a “Space Corps.”97 Pending approval by Congress, the proposed plan 
calls for the Space Force to operate under the authority of the Air Force, akin to 
the relationship between the Marine Corps and the Naval Secretary.98 Perhaps 
bowing to political pressure, Space Policy Directive-4 represents a significant 
backpedal from the Trump Administration’s original call for a Space Force to 
be a true co-equal branch governed by its own civilian department.99  
Despite this compromise, the Space Force faces a difficult path through 
Congress and passage into law.100 The Congressional Research Service has 
 
 95 Many commenters have pointed out the lack of unification of reform ideas. See, e.g., 
Justin T. Johnson, 2017 NDAA: Define the Goldwater-Nichols Problem Before Trying to 
Solve It, HERITAGE FOUND. (July 12, 2016), https://www.heritage.org/defense/ 
report/2017-ndaa-define-the-goldwater-nichols-problem-trying-solve-it [https://per 
ma.cc/Z9QU-H6GK]; Mark Cancian, We Need a Map for Goldwater-Nichols Reform so 
We Don’t Get Lost, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Mar. 17, 2016), 
https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/we-need-a-map-for-goldwater-nichols-reform-
so-we-dont-get-lost/ [https://perma.cc/37NJ-5R5P].  
 96 Trump, supra note 1; see also Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the 
President, President Donald J. Trump Is Launching America’s Space Force, WHITE HOUSE 
(Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-
trump-launching-americas-space-force/ [https://perma.cc/5U4P-46C2]; see, e.g., James 
F. Naughton Jr., President Trump’s Space Force? Lawmakers Set Reactions to Stun, MOAA 
(Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.moaa.org/content/take-action/top-issues/currently-
serving/President-Trump-s-Space-Force--Lawmakers-Set-Reactions-to-Stun/ [https:// 
perma.cc/22G7-Z4VY] (documenting the varied reactions of U.S. lawmakers and Pentagon 
officials).  
 97 Directive-4, supra note 7; see also Jacqueline Klimas, Trump to Approve Lean Space 
Force, POLITICO (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/18/trump-
space-force-1182572 [https://perma.cc/4PU9-G94U].  
 98 Directive-4, supra note 7. 
 99 Bryan Bender & Connor O’Brien, Leaner Space Force Woos Skeptics in Congress, 
POLITICO (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/03/trump-space-
force-pentagon-1132106 [https://perma.cc/V6P4-FSV6].  
 100 See, e.g., Julia Manchester, Dem Pollster: ‘Absurd’ to Think Congress Will Approve 
‘Space Force,’ HILL (Aug. 21, 2018), https://thehill.com/hilltv/what-americas-
thinking/402885-dem-pollster-its-absurd-to-think-space-force-will-get [https://per 
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speculated four possible forms the Space Force could ultimately take: (1) 
consolidation of existing DOD space-related assets, (2) reorganization of 
existing space-related assets into a Unified Combatant Command, (3) creation 
of a “separate branch” within the Air Force Department (embodied by Space 
Policy Directive-4), or (4) creation of a co-equal independent branch with a 
civilian military department.101 
These proposals fall into two categories: those achievable by Executive 
power alone and those that would require Congressional approval. Thus, a brief 
explanation of Congressional and Executive power over military affairs is in 
order. This Part will then detail what is known about Space Policy Directive-4 
and the different alternative proposals that have been considered (and in some 
cases, already implemented) in furtherance of creating a Space Force. Against 
this backdrop, Part IV will then argue that the “Space Force” model consisting 
of a separate co-equal branch with its own civilian department embodies the best 
option forward for a space-based military structure. 
A. How to Create a Space Force 
Article II of the Constitution directly endows the President with military 
powers as Commander in Chief,102 however the exact extent of that power has 
been a continuing source of scholarly and political debate.103 The seminal 
Supreme Court case Youngstown v. Sawyer recognized some implicit 
presidential power to act in the national security context, however that power is 
limited by Congress’s express or implicit approval of such an act.104  
However, while the Constitution does vest the President with significant 
discretion to direct the military war “protective” powers to respond to threats,105 
primary control over peacetime military affairs likely belongs to Congress.106 
Deeply distrustful of a standing army and a tyrannical Chief Executive, the 
Founding Fathers chose to vest the elected civilian legislature with oversight of 
 
ma.cc/E5A5-Q2DQ] (“[S]enators from both sides of the political aisle have expressed 
skepticism.”).  
 101 See STEVEN A. HILDRETH ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10950, TOWARD THE 
CREATION OF A U.S. “SPACE FORCE” 1 (2018). 
 102 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army 
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the 
actual Service of the United States . . . .”). 
 103 See, e.g., Neil Kinkopf, The Statutory Commander in Chief, 81 IND. L.J. 1169, 1170–
71 (2006). 
 104 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643–45 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
 105 See Kinkopf, supra note 103, at 1172 (citing Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective 
Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1993)).  
 106 See Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of 
the U.S. Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 344 n.15 (1994).  
16 IN DEFENSE OF THE SPACE FORCE [Vol. 80  
the Armed Forces and national security.107 Accordingly, Congress possesses 
near-plenary powers to regulate national security under Article I, Section 8.108 
In addition to exercising its authority over defense spending,109 Congress 
exercises substantial oversight over the military through the House and Senate 
Armed Services Committees.110  
While a unilateral executive attempt to create a separate sixth branch is not 
beyond comprehension of a Youngstown-style analysis,111 even Vice President 
Pence and the DOD have conceded that reorganization of the scope and scale 
envisioned by creation of a Space Force as a sixth branch could not be achieved 
through executive power alone.112 Textually, the establishment of a new branch 
sits squarely within Congress’s authority “[t]o make Rules for the Government 
and Regulation of land and naval Forces” or power to “raise and support 
 
 107 Id.; see also Dakota S. Rudesill, The Land and Naval Forces Clause, 86 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 391, 419 (2018). 
 108 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10–13, 15–16; Rudesill, supra note 107, at 408 (listing the 
Define and Punish, Declare War, Captures, Marque and Reprisal, Army, Navy, and Militia 
Clauses).  
 109 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o raise and 
support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than 
two Years.”). 
 110 See S. COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 
113-18, at 19−20 (2013) (Rule XXV, 1(c)(1)); RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
R. X.1(c), R. X.3(b), H. Doc. No. 115-177, at 6, 9 (2015). 
 111 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. 579, 643–44 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring).  
 112 Rebecca Kheel, Senate Emerges as Obstacle to Trump’s ‘Space Force,’ HILL (Aug. 
21, 2018), https://thehill.com/policy/defense/402748-senate-emerges-as-obstacle-to-
trumps-space-force [https://perma.cc/FSZ3-KKE5]; see DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 5, at 
6.  
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Armies.”113 As such, it has been generally accepted by experts114 that to create 
a Space Force as a separate service or independent branch, Congress would have 
to act legislatively to amend Title 10, as it did with the creation of the Marines115 
and the Air Force.116  
With that said, not all purely executive options are off the table. Title 10 
offers the President some latitude to establish space-based national defense 
initiatives through purely executive powers.117 The President has already 
undertaken some such executive measures in the name of “interim steps” 
towards a Space Force.118 However, Congress could ultimately thwart the Space 
Force, or keep any executive option from achieving a more permanent status 
through its legislative prerogatives and tight control over national security 
 
 113 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, 14. However, relying on similar arguments that have 
been used to question the legitimacy of an Air Force, a few legal scholars argue that a literal 
textual reading of Article I, Section 8 gives Congress only power over “land and naval 
forces” and would bar the creation of an Air Force, let alone a Space Force. Of course, a 
constitutional prohibition would be unlikely, given that space-based components are already 
constitutionally in use by the different Armed Forces branches; it is unlikely that moving 
them to an independent branch would render them unconstitutional. Moreover, Congress’s 
plenary power to regulate the Armed Forces has never been seriously challenged. Despite 
these powerful arguments, at least one legal scholar has maintained that the Space Force 
could be too far afield of what the Framers intended when authorizing federal government 
powers and requires a constitutional amendment to establish a Space Force. See, e.g., 
Michael Dorf, Originalists in Space, DORF ON LAW (Aug. 15, 2018), 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2018/08/originalists-in-space.html [https://perma.cc/UM 
R5-ZM35]; Michael Ramsey, Is the Space Force Constitutional?, ORIGINALISM BLOG (Aug. 
20, 2018), https://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2018/08/is-the-
space-force-constitutionalmichael-ramsey.html [https://perma.cc/LQX5-3HDA]; 
Scott Bomboy, The Space Force and the Constitution, NAT’L CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY 
(Aug. 22, 2018), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-space-force-and-the-const 
itution [https://perma.cc/Q2R3-D7QR]; see also HILDRETH ET AL., supra note 101, at 2. 
 114 E.g., Valerie Insinna & Aaron Mehta, Trump Orders Creation of Independent Space 
Force—But Congress Will Still Have Its Say, DEFENSENEWS (June 18, 2018), 
https://www.defensenews.com/space/2018/06/18/trump-orders-creation-of-independ 
ent-space-force/ [https://perma.cc/GS4A-F57K] (“[E]xperts—and a powerful member of 
Congress—believe Trump still needs the support of Congress to make a space force 
happen.”); Koren, supra note 8 (“The Trump administration cannot establish the Space Force 
on its own. It needs Congress.”).  
 115 See The Origins of the Marine Corps, MILITARY.COM, https://www.military.com/ 
military-appreciation-month/origins-of-marine-corps-day.html [https://perma.cc/SU 
2L-KZW6]. 
 116 Eckhardt, supra note 47, at 438; HILDRETH ET AL., supra note 101, at 2.  
 117 By virtue of its status as an executive department, the President has the power to 
direct the DOD, the Secretary of Defense, and the service secretaries within the DOD. See 
10 U.S.C. §§ 111, 113 (2012). The President can establish offices, agencies, activities, or 
commands within the DOD, as long as the President notifies Congress within 60 days. Id. 
§ 111(c). The President also has more explicit delegated statutory power within Title 10, like 
the power to direct the creation of combatant commands. See, e.g., id. § 1641(a).  
 118 See infra Parts III.B.1 & III.B.2.  
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appropriations.119 Accordingly, to create a Space Force consistent with the 
scope of the Trump administration’s ambitions, the executive options put forth 
so far should serve only as fallback options if Congress rejects the more 
expansive vision for a Space Force. 
B. Space Force Proposals 
Proponents for a Space Force do not allege that U.S. space capabilities are 
nonexistent.120 Rather, critics argue that the diffusion of these resources 
throughout the U.S. Armed Forces cause them to be systematically overlooked 
and underfunded.121 There are sixty different space systems and assets spread 
throughout the Department of Defense without any unifying or controlling 
body.122 While nearly 90 percent of the military’s current space portfolio exists 
under the dominion of the Air Force, these resources are housed within all five 
services and several civilian agencies.123 To some, the military’s lack of 
organizational unity for military space assets is symbolic of its low priority 
status, exemplified by the Air Force’s past failures to prioritize its space 
budget.124 This systemic neglect has resulted in the U.S. falling six to eight years 
behind its peers and rival nations, such as Russia and China, in space-based 
military capabilities.125 All of the following proposals seek to remedy the 
neglect of U.S. space power with organizational solutions of various extents and 
degrees.  
1. Consolidation of Existing Space Resources 
The President has executive power to reorganize DOD resources and direct 
the service secretaries to develop new units and provide for greater capabilities 
in already-existing space components.126 Using purely executive authorities, the 
President has already acted to consolidate some of the space-based assets 
scattered around the service branches and implement precursor structures for an 
independent branch.127 Consistent with this mission, the Pentagon also green lit 
internal initiatives like the Space Operations Force and the Space Development 
 
 119 See HILDRETH ET AL., supra note 101, at 1. 
 120 See DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 5, at 9 (“Today all five Military branches possess space 
expertise, but this space cadre is a small percentage of the total force.”).  
 121 See HILDRETH ET AL., supra note 101, at 1 (“[F]ragmentation and overlap in national 
security space acquisition management and oversight have contributed to program delays 
and cancellations, cost increases, and inefficient operations.”).  
 122 Venable, supra note 4.  
 123 Stockton, supra note 4.  
 124 See id. (explaining that “the Air Force’s space power investments have not increased 
since 2013, while its overall spending has climbed 30 percent” in the same time frame). 
 125 See id. 
 126 HILDRETH ET AL., supra note 101, at 1.  
 127 See DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 5, at 3.  
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Agency, as well as the beginnings of an operating structure and civilian 
oversight body for the forthcoming Space Force.128 
However, the presidential power over the functioning of the DOD is not 
absolute. Unsurprisingly, several Air Force leaders have spoken out in 
opposition to moving space-based assets out from under their authority.129 
Swayed by this dissent, Congress could insist on codifying these changes, or 
influence countervailing executive branch action through its oversight and 
appropriation powers.130 Similarly, it follows that if purely executive authorities 
could prompt such change, a future presidential administration could just as 
easily undo this reorganizational progress.  
2. Creation of a Unified Combatant Command 
Another option that takes an even larger step towards an independent branch 
would be to restructure the military’s space-based assets into a Unified 
Combatant Command.131 Under Title 10, the President has the discretion to 
organize military force within the existing structure of the Department of 
Defense.132 In particular, the President has the authority and discretion under 10 
U.S.C. § 161 to direct the establishment of combatant commands.133  
On December 18, 2018, President Trump exercised this power and directed 
the Secretary of Defense to establish the U.S. Space Command as the 11th 
Unified Combatant Command.134 As part of its fiscal year 2019 defense 
appropriations, Congress had tasked the Secretary of Defense to establish Space 
 
 128 Id. at 4. 
 129 See, e.g., Lara Seligman, Trump Considers Firing Air Force Chief Over Space Force 
Pushback, FOREIGN POLICY (Oct. 4, 2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/04/trump-
considers-ousting-air-force-head-over-space-force-pushback/ [https://perma.cc/6VR3 
-VE23].  
 130 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.  
 131 A leaked Pentagon report showed that a Space Force would absorb components from 
a cross section of other branches, including the Naval Satellite Operations Center, the Navy’s 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, parts of Air Force Space Command, and the 
Army’s 1st Space Brigade. DEP’T OF DEF., INTERIM REPORT ON ORGANIZATIONAL AND 
MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE COMPONENTS OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 6 (2018)§§§; Marcus Weisgerber, Pentagon May Create a 
Combatant Command for Space, DEFENSE ONE (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www. 
defenseone.com/technology/2018/03/pentagon-may-create-combatant-command-
space/146430/ [https://perma.cc/H8EE-63R3].  
 132 See The Origins of the Marine Corps, supra note 115.  
 133 10 U.S.C. § 161(a) (2012); see Oriana Pawlyk, Key Space Force Directive Missing 
from White House Meeting Agenda, MILITARY.COM (Oct. 18, 2018), https:// 
www.military.com/daily-news/2018/10/18/key-space-force-directive-missing-white-
house-meeting-agenda.html [https://perma.cc/JBV2-R6JZ]. 
 134 Establishment of United States Space Command as a Unified Combatant Command, 
83 Fed. Reg. 65,483 (Dec. 18, 2018).  
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Command as a subordinate to U.S. Strategic Command,135 but Trump’s order 
prompted the establishment of Space Command as a more expansive Unified 
Combatant Command (on par with U.S. Strategic Command).136 Despite this 
step forward, the Trump Administration was unsatisfied, arguing that the Space 
Command merely complements its ultimate Space Force plans.137 This Space 
Command presents an interim measure that the White House hopes will be 
folded into an eventual independent space branch.138  
However, even this statutory action does not insulate a Space Force from 
later Congressional or Presidential rejection. Congress can easily create or 
abolish Combatant Commands by amending Title 10.139 Congress could also 
impose additional regulations on the new Space Command, as it did with the 
U.S. Cyber Command.140 As a creature of pure executive authority, combatant 
commands also lack the permanence of a service or branch. In fact, a U.S. Space 
Command once existed but was dissolved into U.S. Strategic Command in 2002 
during defense reorganization following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001.141 
3. Space Policy Directive-4 a.k.a. the Space “Corps” Model 
After months of uncertainty, the proposal entitled Space Policy Directive-4 
appears to have won out as the compromise plan between the Pentagon and the 
original White House position. While several defense and White House 
administration officials said this meets the “intent of a sixth branch,” the 
proposal would have substantial steps to becoming a “co-equal” branch; if 
implemented, the proposal would give the service chief of the new “Space 
Corps” a seat on the JCS, but would still have its administration and acquisition 
procedures governed by the bureaucratic staff of the Air Force.142 The Space 
Corps would have a small footprint with no control over its own budget, training 
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facilities, or bases.143 The questions of rank, uniforms, and service academy 
remain unclear.144 
The appeal of this proposal undoubtedly lies in its political palatability. In 
September, legislators balked when Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson 
proposed a $13 billion price tag for the Space Force.145 By gradually absorbing 
Air Force assets and sharing the Air Force’s civilian bureaucracy, this Space 
Corps option substantially limits the cost of a Space Force.146 As currently 
envisioned, the Space Force would start with $270 million in fiscal year 2020 
and then scale up gradually to the tune of $2 billion over 5 years, absorbing $8 
billion worth of space programs and personnel currently in the Air Force 
budget.147 Nevertheless, this compromise proposal faces no easy path through 
Congress, and some powerful members of Congress, including the Chairman of 
the House Armed Services Committee, have publicly expressed their 
opposition.148  
4. The Original Proposal a.k.a. the Space “Force” Model 
President Trump and Vice President Pence initially advocated for an even 
further-reaching proposal that would have marked the first creation of a new 
military branch since the creation of the Air Force in 1947.149 Under this 
approach, the Space Force would have its own civilian military department and 
exist as an entirely co-equal branch to the Army, Navy, and Air Force.150 Unlike 
any of the other proposals, this approach has the Space Force entirely 
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independent of control by other branches: the Space Force would manage its 
own training, logistics, and acquisition processes.151 While the scope of this new 
branch would indeed be broad, advocates have indicated no intent to subsume 
NASA or any other civilian agencies with a role in space.152  
This plan of action has faced fierce pushback from Congress and even the 
Pentagon itself over the cost of creating additional independent space 
bureaucracy.153 Critics argue that an entire new civilian department would 
needlessly duplicate existing Air Force bureaucratic functions and impose 
needless overhead on the fledgling branch.154 However, regardless of whether 
the Space Corps plan or another less expansive plan prevails, Trump’s ultimate 
goal remains this option: an independent co-equal branch.155 Importantly, no 
one believes the Space Force will be established in one fell swoop: both the 
scope and finer details of the Space Force will be the subject of continued debate 
in successive fiscal year appropriations bills.156 
IV. THE VALUES AND LESSONS OF GOLDWATER-NICHOLS SUPPORT AN 
INDEPENDENT AND CO-EQUAL SPACE FORCE 
Notwithstanding some calls for updates to the legislation,157 the Goldwater-
Nichols Defense Reorganization Act remains the law of the land when 
discussing defense organization. The virtues embodied in the Act should serve 
as a guide for weighing the competing policy tensions surrounding the current 
Space Force debate. Proponents for a Space Force can also glean important 
lessons from the political battle for Goldwater-Nichols, which presages some of 
the legislative hurdles ahead for an independent Space Force. 
Formally, Goldwater-Nichols states eight objectives of the legislation 
unequivocally at the beginning of the Act.158 From these objectives and the 
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history of Goldwater-Nichols, I surmise three noteworthy themes with particular 
applicability to the Space Force: (1) organizational clarity and clear 
responsibilities, (2) enhanced civilian authority, and (3) ending service 
parochialism. Taken as a whole, these themes support an independent co-equal 
Space Force as superior to the other options considered.159  
A. Organizational Clarity and Clear Responsibilities 
The stark reality is that “[the U.S.] military now is completely dependent on 
space.”160 Yet, space is “not getting the attention it deserves.”161 As far back as 
2001, a Pentagon commission acknowledged: “National security space 
organization and management today fail to reflect the growing importance of 
space to U.S. interests.”162 Organizational confusion has resulted in neglect of 
space national security and risked U.S. interests in this crucial domain.163 While 
the other proposals offer improvements on the status quo by raising the profile 
of space warfighting, budgetary concerns should not prevent Congress from 
achieving optimal organizational clarity in a separate civilian branch. 
In response to service dysfunction, Goldwater-Nichols sought to streamline 
the military command structure to facilitate effective governance, while still 
retaining a robust pluralistic decision-making process.164 The regime preceding 
Goldwater-Nichols suffered from a dearth of clear responsibility, with 
widespread uncertainty in the duties of many major defense leaders.165 Were 
service secretaries subject to the direct authority of the Defense Secretary?166 
Was a service chief’s primary duty to his or her own branch or the JCS?167 
Should the service chiefs primarily focus on “hoteling” functions or warfighting 
functions?168 When joint operations were conducted who would lead?169 
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Conducting military affairs without clear answers to these questions led directly 
to military disasters, such as Grenada and Beirut.170  
Now, Congress has the opportunity to correct the analogous disunity in 
space military assets before the U.S. faces a similar military disaster, or an even 
worse “Space Pearl Harbor.”171 While the context of organizational confusion 
differs slightly in the Space Force context, the virtues of Goldwater-Nichols 
remain instructive. Confused responsibilities and lack of unified control have 
undeniably hampered the creation of space national security.172 But under Space 
Policy Directive-4 and the other proposals, many space-based responsibilities 
would remain scattered throughout the branches.173 Without its own civilian 
secretary and complete autonomy over acquisition, space warfighting will 
remain a “technological tower of Babel” without clear leadership in space 
strategy development.174  
The unique nature of organizational issues in the space context calls for a 
separate civilian military a fortiori because the successful administration of the 
Space Force will turn on technology acquisition more so than conducting 
missions.175 Responding to widespread waste, fraud, and abuse in the 
acquisition of military equipment, Goldwater-Nichols saw the importance of 
efficiency acquisition and accordingly vested each service secretary with sole 
responsibility over acquisition.176 Yet under Space Policy Directive-4 and the 
other executive options, the Air Force Secretary, rather than the Space Force 
itself, would have control over the space equipment acquisition process.177 
Although reorganizing the Space Force into a combatant command or a branch 
under the Air Force may provide the advantage of having all warfighting 
capacities under one chain of command, such a Space Force will not have its 
interests equivalently represented on the acquisition front. A Space Force 
service secretary would ensure that the Space Force could set its own budget, 
rather than risk further budgetary mismanagement by the Air Force.178 Optimal 
organizational clarity and clearly defined role responsibilities can be achieved 
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only by consolidating all functions into one, civilian accountable, independent 
branch.  
The most often cited rejoinder to the independent Space Force model with 
a separate civilian department model is that it would increase the size the 
Pentagon bureaucracy, thereby reducing efficiency and increasing costs 
unnecessarily.179 These arguments appear less persuasive when compared to the 
military’s experience with Goldwater-Nichols. From an operational perspective, 
military efficacy would not suffer, because Goldwater-Nichols already vests the 
JCS Chairman with power to override dissenting JCS opinions.180 From an 
efficiency perspective, the exact same “too much bureaucracy” arguments were 
made by reform opponents during Goldwater-Nichols to oppose 
decentralization, yet Goldwater-Nichols has been credited as a success in 
rooting out systemic inefficiency.181 
While cost was less of a hot button issue in the Goldwater-Nichols 
legislative process, cost should still not be a dispositive factor in the Space Force 
debate.182 Even the highest projected price tag—$13 billion183—appears small 
when contextualized against the $350 billion of U.S. space-dependent 
commerce at risk by Chinese and Russian anti-satellite technology,184 and even 
smaller when compared to the overall annual defense budget of nearly $717 
billion.185 The Space Force would also be able to absorb a portion of the Air 
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Force’s budget and assets, meaning that this cost increase would be a relative 
increase, not an absolute one.186 At bottom, even if cost is very high, space 
strategy is unlikely to meaningfully develop without a significant allocation of 
attention and resources.  
B. Enhanced Civilian Control  
Inferior military advice provided to civilian decision makers, caused by 
“inter-service logrolling,” was a contributing cause to the military operational 
failures leading up to the passage of Goldwater-Nichols.187 In light of the 
importance of space in the future of national security, the Space Force should 
be its own completely independent branch to provide the best possible military 
advice to the Commander in Chief. If the Space Force remains a subordinate 
branch to the Air Force, there is no guarantee that space interests will be 
represented to a degree corresponding with their increasing importance.188 A 
separate civilian department will ensure that space interests are adequately 
represented, increased civilian control and accountability over those resources, 
and an increase in the quality of joint advice directed to the Commander in 
Chief. However, in light of the story of Goldwater-Nichols, it appears clear that 
persuading civilian authorities of the need for such changes will require a 
substantial legislative effort.  
In one way, the positive effects on civilian control created by a co-equal 
Space Force branch are obvious. For example, under a Space Force model, 
components can directly interface with civilian authorities without impediment 
by the Air Force Secretary or any other intermediary.189 A direct line of 
communication from the Space Force to the President and Congress allows 
those government actors to vindicate space-related national security priorities 
directly, without losing the force of such directives in a trickle down military 
bureaucracy.190 Similarly, a dedicated Space Force Secretary allows the Space 
Force to better vindicate its own policy interests or resource needs requiring 
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legislative attention, by directly lobbying Congress and powerbrokers within the 
DOD.191 Under Space Policy Directive-4 and the other plans, such space 
interests could be subordinated to Air Force needs without direct recourse.  
On the other hand, a less obvious benefit of creating an independent Space 
Force is that military decentralization inherently promotes accountability and 
civilian control.192 Decentralization enhances control by civilian authorities, 
who can reward branches with more resources for faithful adherence to civilian-
set policy.193 Also, the Senate Armed Services Committee has direct jurisdiction 
over the military departments and could regularly exercise its oversight power 
over the proposed Space Department.194 Moreover, some have expressed 
concern with the gradual erosion of civilian control of the military, blaming the 
“jointness” that Goldwater-Nichols promoted as having created services as a 
unified bloc of power diametrically opposed to the restraining influences of 
civilian governance.195 Creating an even more powerful Air Force by giving it 
formalized control over a growing portfolio of space assets could further 
exacerbate these civilian control problems. 
Despite the compelling arguments for an independent Space Force, the 
Space Force will likely face an uphill battle in convincing civilian authorities 
that improvements in civilian control justify upending the status quo. Because 
of the Pentagon’s past military victories in most major conflicts, it suffers from 
a “failure of success,” which makes it often unwilling to embrace organizational 
innovations.196 It took the public failures in Panama, Beirut, and Grenada to 
garner the political will to ultimately succeed in passing the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act.197 No similarly high-profile event has occurred to overcome the political 
apathy surrounding the Space Force.  
Further, Goldwater-Nichols benefited from support by a bipartisan coalition 
led by high-profile and popular Congressmen Barry Goldwater, Sam Nunn, and 
Bill Nichols.198 Such a bipartisan effort may not be feasible in the bitterly 
divided politics of today, especially with evidence that the Space Force has 
become a highly partisan issue.199 Whereas Goldwater and Nunn’s success 
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turned on a deliberate campaign of persuasion and impassioned speeches from 
the Senate floor in favor of reorganization,200 no clear legislative champion has 
yet emerged to promote the need for an independent Space Force.201 Thus in the 
absence of such legislative advantages, the lessons of Goldwater-Nichols should 
serve as an especially important historical example of the benefits of 
reorganization within the military.  
C. Ending Service Parochialism 
Without the autonomy stemming from an independent branch, space 
national security could suffer from the same inter-service turf wars that proved 
so counterproductive before Goldwater-Nichols.202 Goldwater-Nichols sought 
to reduce inter-branch competition where the “needs and interests of the 
individual military services were being prioritized over joint mission 
requirements.”203 Before Goldwater-Nichols reform, any JCS member could 
exercise a de facto veto over military operations, which hampered a cohesive 
military structure.204 Under Space Policy Directive-4 and the other proposals, 
many space-related resources and functions would remain spread among the 
other branches, preserving that de facto veto and chaotic fragmentation.205 Only 
by removing incentives to act in each branch’s self-interest, and wresting 
developing technology free from entrenched interests, did military power 
eventually work together more cohesively and effectively.206  
However, perhaps motivated by resource competition and an unwillingness 
to cede its dominance over space,207 the Air Force has already firmly asserted 
its parochial interests in the realm of space by publicly opposing plans for a 
Space Force.208 Some have accused the Air Force of “poisoning the well” by 
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aggressively lobbying the Senate against the idea of a Space Force.209 Others 
have even accused the Air Force Secretary of conducting a secret effort to 
undermine the White House’s Space Force proposals, including purposely 
inflating the cost estimates and requirements to discourage Congress from 
“embark[ing] on a politically fraught effort” to create an independent Space 
Force.210  
However, when viewed in the context of Goldwater-Nichols and its 
predecessors, this opposition by entrenched service interests looks entirely 
natural, and may actually support the creation of an independent Space Force. 
The Air Force’s vehement opposition to the creation of a new branch within its 
area of perceived dominance has several historical analogues, both during and 
prior to Goldwater-Nichols, which demonstrate how Congress must initially 
overcome parochial service resistance to advance the long-term development of 
military functionality.  
In many ways, the Air Force’s opposition to an independent branch is 
analogous to the Navy’s opposition to Goldwater-Nichols reform.211 Despite its 
eventual resounding legislative success, passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act 
was not universally welcomed. Service chiefs from every branch, but especially 
the Navy,212 came out strongly against any attempt at significant defense 
reforms like Goldwater-Nichols.213 The Navy’s strong tradition of 
independence and decentralized command made it a particularly vehement 
opponent of Goldwater-Nichols, a reform effort it believed likely to compromise 
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its historical independence.214 Compared to “trench warfare,” the legislative 
fight for Goldwater-Nichols against anti-reform interests in the military was 
fierce.215 Congress had to overcome the service chiefs who used their platform 
and influence to vocally advocate for the maintenance of the status quo and 
successfully convinced some legislators to oppose reform.216 Even the civilian 
authorities in the Pentagon had initially favored weak internal management 
initiatives to correct the organizational problems Congress had identified.217 
Fortunately, emboldened by the debacles in Grenada and Beirut, Congress 
defeated the parochial Pentagon and military interests to achieve necessary 
lasting change.218 
This theme of service chief opposition to decentralization predates even 
Goldwater-Nichols. Ironically, the creation of the modern Air Force itself was 
vehemently opposed by existing service interests. Fearful of the threat the Air 
Force posed to their dominance, the Navy and Marine Corps were “dragged 
kicking and screaming” into the independent Air Force regime created by the 
National Security Act.219 Some argue that the Army Air Corps was an example 
of a service that went independent too early and suffered setbacks in the form 
of dangerous planes that put service members at risk.220 While space 
warfighting strategy is in its nascent stages, the example of the Army Air Corps 
actually shows that it was only through the dedication of resources that strategy 
and technology developed to create the powerful Air Force that would emerge 
in World War II.221 No one seriously questions the need for an Air Force now. 
So when modern Air Force interests argue that the space strategy is too 
undeveloped to warrant its own branch and should remain under the Air 
Force,222 the branch’s own history instructs otherwise on this point. Moreover, 
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while flight technology was in its infancy at the establishment of the Air Force, 
space technology is already regularly in use in military operations.223  
The military establishment’s opposition to new technology and strategic 
innovation goes back even further than the Air Force. United States military 
thinkers in the late nineteenth century initially rejected even the development of 
naval power.224 In 1890, Navy officer Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote the seminal 
book, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, to urge the United States to 
invest in a strong navy.225 Mahan’s book successfully changed the public 
perception of naval power and encouraged investment in a strong navy, by 
arguing that sea power allows nations to control and protect “lines of 
communication” from other nations.226 Now, many years later, no one seriously 
questions the need for U.S. naval power. As the world expands into the final 
frontier, the Space Force’s chief mission would be built around an analogous 
mission of protecting the crucial telecommunications infrastructure the U.S. 
keeps in space.227  
In sum, recounting the stories of historical opposition to military innovation 
show that the mounting pressure on the Space Force from entrenched interests 
is not dispositive of the Space Force’s actual importance or projected success. 
In fact, these stories show that many past doomsayers have been proven wrong 
by the effectiveness of each succeeding era of military organizational 
innovation. While the Navy and other branches were convinced that a host of 
problems would occur from Goldwater-Nichols, it is widely regarded as a 
success in conducting joint operations and improving the overall military 
success of the Armed Forces.228 In the case of the Space Force, wresting control 
of it from the Air Force and investing in its parity with other branches will best 
serve the long-term interests of the Armed Forces.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The debates over the Space Force mark a novel and complex chapter in the 
ongoing story of how best to organize military power in a democratic society. 
However, policymakers can follow the lead of similar defense reorganization 
efforts that preceded it. The lessons of the Goldwater-Nichols Act should play 
an important part in discerning which organizational remedies can correct 
widely acknowledged deficits in space national security. Without a doubt, any 
of the Space Force options proposed would be a step in the right direction by 
increasing the emphasis on developing space warfighting strategy. But in light 
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of all the circumstances and lessons of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, an 
independent Space Force, separate and equal to the United States Air Force, 
offers the ideal structure for protecting America’s ever more important interests 
in space.  
